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Abstract  14 
Background and Objectives: The Modified Stroop Task (MST) effect refers to a prolonged 15 
reaction time (RT) in color-naming words related to an individual’s disorder. Some authors 16 
argue that its absence in people who claim symptoms might be an indication of feigning. 17 
Method: We tested whether the MST effect is robust against feigning attempts and compared 18 
its absence as an index of feigning with over-reporting tendencies on a symptom 19 
questionnaire (i.e., the Self-Reported Symptom Inventory (SRSI)). We included participants 20 
(n = 22) who i) reported current high impact of aversive experiences (High scorers), ii) 21 
reported current low impact (Low scorers) of aversive experiences (n= 24), and iii) actors (n = 22 
18) with low impact, but instructed to feign current high psychological impact of aversive life 23 
events (Simulators). We administered the MST, including impact-related, neutral, and 24 
feigning-related words, and the SRSI. Results: We found no MST effect for impact-related 25 
words in the high scorers group, or for feigning-relat d words in the simulators. Relative to 26 
high scorers and low scorers, simulators exhibited significantly longer RTs on all types of 27 
words and they also endorsed significantly more bogus symptoms on the SRSI. Thus, the 28 
SRSI was a more sensitive measure of feigning than t e absence of an MST effect. 29 
Limitation: Some limitations are related to our reliance on a sub-clinical student sample, 30 
whereas others reflect the unresolved issues surrounding the MST. Thus, the generalizability 31 
of our results is uncertain. Conclusion: Our findings add to the doubts on the idea that the 32 
MST can be used to differentiate between genuine and feigned complaints. 33 
Key words: Modified Stroop task, Feigning, SRSI, Simulators. 34 
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Detecting feigned high impact experiences: A symptom over-report questionnaire 36 
outperforms the emotional Stroop task 37 
The original Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) constitutes of color words presented in 38 
different colors, of which the participants should name the color and disregard the content. 39 
The stimuli are divided into congruent (word “red” presented in red color) and incongruent 40 
(word “red” presented in green color) categories. In order to explore participants’ attentional 41 
bias, the reaction time to the two types of stimuli is compared, and the difference is known as 42 
the Stroop Effect [SE=RT(incongruent)-RT(congruent)] (see MacLeod, 1991). The Modified 43 
Stroop task (MST), also known as the Emotional Stroop task (e.g., Williams et al., 1996), 44 
although sharing a similar name with the original task, crucially differs from it (see Algom, 45 
Chajut, Lev, 2004). To begin with, the MST lacks the (in)congruency of stimuli, and instead 46 
includes disorder-related and neutral words of which the colors have to be named as quickly 47 
as possible while ignoring the meaning of the words (e.g., Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 48 
2000). The reaction times of participants to the different word categories are compared, and, if 49 
a difference emerges, it is labeled as the MST effect. This delayed response is considered to be 50 
a sign of attentional bias among genuine patients (Elsesser, Sartory & Tackenberg, 2004), 51 
although some authors state that, in the case of the MST, other, not attention-related 52 
mechanisms, might rather be driving this effect (Algom et al., 2004; see below).  53 
Many authors report that people with certain psychological disorders exhibit delays in 54 
naming the color of words that specifically refer to their disorder (e.g., McNally, English, & 55 
Lipke, 1993). For example, several studies have found that PTSD patients take longer to 56 
color-name trauma-relevant than trauma-irrelevant words (Buckley, Galovski, Blanchard, & 57 
Hickling, 2003). In this vein, these authors stated that the presence of the MST effect for 58 
trauma-related words reflects genuine trauma symptos, whereas the absence of the effect in 59 
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el. (2003) proposed that the MST could serve as a screening tool for differentiating between 61 
feigners and people truly suffering from PTSD. This argument was supported by the 62 
assumption that the reaction-time measures are less vulnerable to manipulation than patients’ 63 
self-reports (Constans et al., 2014; Beck, Freeman, Shipherd, Hamblen, & Lackner, 2001; 64 
Kaspi, McNally, & Amir, 1995).  65 
To test this hypothesis, Buckley et al. (2003) used th  MST to investigate the 66 
sensitivity of the MST effect to feigning. Six PTSD patients, six actors who were instructed to 67 
feign PTSD, and six non-anxious participants (control g oup) took part in the study. Actors 68 
were taught about PTSD, but not about the typical response pattern of PTSD patients on the 69 
MST. All participants completed an MST that involved PTSD-related and neutral words. 70 
Overall, PTSD patients and actors had significantly slower reaction times than controls for all 71 
words presented. However, the response latencies of act rs were similar for PTSD-related 72 
words and neutral words, while participants in the PTSD group exhibited the typical MST 73 
effect (i.e., slower color-naming for PTSD-related words only). These results led the 74 
researchers to conclude that absence of an MST effect might indicate feigning of PTSD: 75 
“…reaction times to Stroop tasks may be useful adjuncts to clinicians who are attempting to 76 
discern psychopathology from malingering” (Buckley et al., 2003, p. 65). They also argued 77 
that future work should focus on the “magnitude of difference” between latencies for color-78 
naming trauma-related words and latencies for neutral words so as to determine a cutoff point 79 
that might enhance diagnostic decision making (Buckley et al., 2003). 80 
Three considerations a priori cast doubt on the idea that the absence of an MST effect 81 
is diagnostic of feigned PTSD or any other disorder. First, the idea presupposes that MST 82 
effects in psychopathological groups – e.g., people with PTSD – are robust, but evidence 83 
suggest they are not. For example, an earlier study of Buckley and colleagues (2002) found 84 













FEIGNING AVERSIVE EXPERIENCES       5 
specific MST effect but rather an overall longer reaction time on all three categories (i.e., 86 
neutral, panic-related, and PTSD-related) of words (Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 2002). 87 
In other research, the MST effect in PTSD patients has been difficult to reproduce (e.g., 88 
Shipherd & Salters-Pedneault, 2008) and a number of unpublished dissertations have reported 89 
small or no MST effects in PTSD patients (e.g., Kimble, Frueh, & Marks, 2009). 90 
Second, and related to the first point, the extant literature is unclear about the reaction 91 
time pattern that should be characteristic for feign rs: absence of a specific MST effect or 92 
general slowing of reaction times? Constans et al. (2014) examined the MST performance of 93 
war veterans with and without PTSD and with and without a tendency to over-report 94 
symptoms (which conceptually comes close to feignin). Patients with over-reporting 95 
tendencies had overall significantly longer response times than PTSD patients without over-96 
reporting style tendencies or controls. These results raise the question as to what an overall 97 
delayed response pattern indicates. Does it reflect th  cognitive load (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & 98 
Leal, 2008) of feigners who are pre-occupied with how to fabricate their symptoms in a 99 
convincing way? If that is the case, general (i.e, non-specific) slowing of responses rather than 100 
the specific absence of an MST effect might be diagnostic of feigning. These mixed findings 101 
raise a more fundamental question: What does the Modified Stroop task actually measure? Is 102 
it the attentional bias or emotional arousal associated with certain words (MacLeod, Mathews, 103 
& Tata, 1986), or a preoccupation with a specific topic (Cannon, 2003; Mathews & MacLeod, 104 
1985)? For example, Cannon (2003) found an MST effect or feigning-related words (e.g., lie, 105 
fake) among students who were instructed to feign mild brain trauma. This suggests that the 106 
MST effect merely reflects participants’ current con erns – whether they pertain to their 107 
disorder or deception relating to that disorder. However, Thomas and Fremouw (2009) failed 108 
to find the MST effect for feigning-related words in a group with PTSD, a group without 109 
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feigning words in those who are instructed to feign is unreliable. Some authors argue that the 111 
traditional SE and the MST effect rely on different mechanisms and that, while the SE 112 
actually captures the attentional bias, the MST effect is exhibited due to the threat-driven 113 
generic slowdown (Algom et al., 2004).  114 
A third issue concerns the diagnostic power of the MST effect, and specifically the 115 
purported likelihood of the absence of the effect in feigners. Even if it is assumed that the 116 
MST effect is robust in the sense that it occurs fa more often in genuine patients that in 117 
feigners, the question remains whether its absence allows for better identification of feigners 118 
than self-report instruments that screen for sympto over-reporting. An example of such self-119 
report instrument is the Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI; Merten, Merckelbach, Giger, 120 
& Stevens, 2016), which includes genuine and pseudosymptoms. Our previous study 121 
(Boskovic, Biermans, Merten, Jelicic, Hope, & Merckelbach, 2018) focused on feigned test-122 
anxiety in students and showed that the MST effect is easy to fabricate and that the SRSI was 123 
more effective in detecting feigners than the absence of an MST effect.  124 
In this study, we wanted to compare the MST with the SRSI to examine the extent to 125 
which both methods discriminate between feigned and genuine PTSD-like symptoms, using a 126 
similar design to the study by Buckley et al. (2003). However, the standing ethical committee 127 
restrained us from including students with full-blown PTSD in our sample. Instead, we were 128 
allowed to include a subclinical student sample comprising (i) individuals who reported 129 
currently experiencing a high psychological impact of previous aversive life events (High 130 
scorers); (ii) individuals who reported a low impact of previous aversive life events (Low 131 
scorers); and (iii) Actors who were instructed to feign PTSD symptoms. The three groups 132 
were administered an MST involving impact-related, f igning-related, and neutral words. 133 
Additionally, we administered the SRSI. We expected that actors would show the typical 134 













FEIGNING AVERSIVE EXPERIENCES       7 
2003). We also anticipated that Actors would endorse significantly more genuine and 136 
pseudosymptoms on the SRSI than the High or Low scorers, and that by using this measure it 137 
would be possible to detect over 70% of Actors as simulators, as in our previous study 138 
(Boskovic et al., 2018). In order to have a closer look at participants’ traits that might have an 139 
influence on their responding style, we also screened participants for their fantasy proneness 140 
(rich imagery; Wilson & Barber, 1983). Fantasy proneness was shown to be related with over-141 
endorsement of atypical items on symptoms measures (M rckelbach, 2004), thus, we wanted 142 
to investigate whether this trait plays any role in their performance.  143 
Method 144 
Sample 145 
In total, we recruited 138 participants, 92 psychology students for the two impact 146 
scores groups and 46 actors, students from Faculty of Performing Arts and working actors 147 
from local city theatres. An a priori G-power analysis based on the effect (Cohen’s d = 0.92) 148 
found in Buckley et al. (2003) revealed an ideal sample size of 51 participants. Due to 149 
applying elimination criteria (see Procedure section; nimpact groups = 29 and nactors = 21), and 150 
attrition of participants who passed the pre-screening (nimpact groups = 17 and nactors = 7), our final 151 
sample included 64 participants (81.2% female). Participants were assigned to: 1) a High 152 
scorers group (n = 22); 2) a Low scorers group (n = 24), or 3) Actors (with low impact scores) 153 
(n = 18). Participant ages ranged from 18 to 35 years (M = 19.83, SD = 3.61 years). 154 
Participants from the High scorers and Low scorers groups received two credit points (0.5 for 155 
pre-screening and 1.5 for the experiment) for participation, while Actors received the 156 
compensation (£10) only after finishing the whole study. 157 
In order for actors to be eligible to participate, they needed to practice acting, with or 158 
without official training; 22.2% of the participants identified as professional actors, 33.3% 159 
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while 44.5% did not have any official training, but were currently practising acting. On 161 
average, Actors had been practising acting for two years (range = 1-108 months).  162 
Measures 163 
Aversive Events Lists. By combining items from the Inventory of College Students’ 164 
Recent Life Experience (Kohn, Lafreniere, & Gurevich, 1990), the Negative Event (hassle) 165 
Scale for Middle Aged Adults (Maybery, 2013), and the shorter form of the List of Recent 166 
Experiences (Henderson et al., 1981), we created a list of 18 aversive events (e.g., end of 167 
intimate relationship, death of family member/close fri nd; see Supplemental table 1). The 168 
events were selected to fit prevalent experiences among university students (Kohn et al., 169 
1990). Participants also had the opportunity to add other aversive events if not already listed. 170 
Participants were asked to choose/add the most aversive event from the list that had happened 171 
to them in the previous six months.  172 
Impact of Event Scale – Revised (IES-R; Weiss, 2004; Cronbach’s alpha current 173 
study = .93). This 22-item scale assesses reactions to aversive events. Participants were asked 174 
to report about their feelings towards a selected event in the previous seven days. The IES-R 175 
includes three subscales: Intrusion, Avoidance, and Hyperarousal. Typical item is “Any 176 
reminder brought back feelings about it”. The responses are given using 5-point Likert scale 177 
(anchors: 0 = Not at all; 4 = Extremely), and mean scores are calculated for each subscale.  178 
PTSD Checklist for DSM 5 (PCL-5; Weathers et al., 2013; Cronbach’s alpha current 179 
study = .92). The PCL-5 includes 20 symptom items and participants are asked whether they 180 
experienced any of these symptoms in the previous month. The PCL-5 correlates highly with 181 
the IES-R (Creamer, Bell, & Failla, 2003). Responses are given on 5-point Likert scale 182 
(anchors: 0 = Never; 4 = Extremely). Typical item is “Feeling very upset when something 183 
reminded you of the stressful experience”. We excluded participants who scored 3 (“often”) 184 
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Modified Stroop Task (MST). This task was created using an E-prime application, 186 
version 2.0.10.353 (see pstnet.com). The words (font Calibri, 80 points) in different colors 187 
were presented on a computer screen (41.1 by 40.2 cm)1, 1000 ms after a fixation cross had 188 
appeared in the center of the screen, and participants had unlimited time to provide a 189 
response. The response was given by clicking on a particular letter on the keyboard that 190 
corresponded with one of three word colors (key “D”was painted in red, “H” in green, and 191 
“L” in cyan) on the screen. The reaction time was measured in ms (measurement error = 1 192 
msec). The task included three types of words: Impact-related (e.g., Nightmare, Cry, Threat; 193 
Buckley et al., 2002; Moradi et al., 1999); Feigning-related (e.g., Liar, Fake, Scam; Cannon, 194 
2003), and Neutral words (e.g., Chair, Wall, Pencil; Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001). 195 
The three word categories did not differ in their aver ge length (F (2, 35) = .63, p = .54). Each 196 
word was presented three times, in a different, randomized order, and a different color. 197 
Participants were instructed to react as fast as pos ible to the colors of the word and to ignore 198 
its content. In total, there were 108 trials (12 words x 3 word groups x 3 colors). Prior to the 199 
experimental trials, participants were presented with 15 (5 words x 3 colors) practice trials 200 
with neutral words (e.g., Belt, Map, Bottle). To test for MST effects, we subtracted latency for 201 
neutral words from latency for Impact-related words and latency for neutral words from that 202 
of feigning-related words. 203 
Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI; Merten et al., 2016). The SRSI includes two 204 
superordinate scales: One that lists genuine, plausible ymptoms (e.g., depression, PTSD, 205 
anxiety, pain; Cronbach’s alpha = .92) and one that pertains to pseudosymptoms (Cronbach’s 206 
alpha = .84). An example of a genuine symptom is: “In the mornings, I wake up earlier than 207 
usual”. An example of a pseudosymptom is; “I can`t remember what happened to me, but I 208 
                                                          
1 The distance between the participants’ eyes and the screen was approximately 55 cm. The visual angle was 
about 15 degrees. Ink colors are standard RGB 24-bit Epr me/Windows colors. Precisely, red: RGB values are 
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constantly dream about it”. For each symptom, participants indicated whether or not they 209 
suffer from it (False/True) and the total number of genuine and pseudosymptoms are then 210 
summed (ranges 0-50). To identify feigners, Merten et al. (2016) recommended a cutoff of 9 211 
pseudosymptoms. At this cut point, sensitivity is .89 and specificity is .81. 212 
 Creative Experience Scale (CEQ; Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001; 213 
Cronbach’s alpha = .76). The CEQ contains 25 dichotomous (i.e., Yes/No) items assessing 214 
the extent to which a person is fantasy prone. Typical items is: “I am never bored because I 215 
start fantasizing when things get boring”. “Yes” answers are summed, with higher scores 216 
indicating higher levels of fantasy proneness.  217 
Procedure 218 
The study included two parts: A pre-screening phase and the main experiment. In both 219 
parts, the participants were asked to provide informed consent. The pre-screening was 220 
conducted online, using the online platform Qualtrics. Participants were initially informed that 221 
the focus of the study was about processing of emotional information. Participants were asked 222 
to select or add one event that had happened to them in previous six months from the 223 
Aversive Events List, after which they completed the IES –R and the PCL-5. 224 
Exclusion of Participants. In order to adhere to the ethical restrictions, participants 225 
were excluded from further participation if: 1) the event they reported was traumatic and there 226 
was a concern that including them in the study would contribute to their distress (e.g., 227 
“suicidal ideas”; “severe illness”; “jumped on and beaten while going back home at night”; n 228 
= 3); 2) their score on PCL-5 score was above three (“often”; n = 3); and 3) if their scores on 229 
the IES-R subscales (Intrusion; Avoidance, and Hyperarousal) were not in accordance with 230 
the group assignment criteria (either the scores on all three subscales above 1.5 or below 1.5; 231 
n = 43). Participants were not informed of the exact reason for not including them in the 232 
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information about mental health concerns were supplied to all participants (see Supplemental 234 
Table 2). 235 
Group Assignment. Participants who passed the pre-screening were assigned either to 236 
High Scorers group, Low Scorers group, or Actors group. Participants were assigned to the 237 
High Scorers if they had a mean score above 1.5 on the total IES-R scale, but also on its three 238 
separate subscales (total range from 0 to 4). Low Scorers and Actors needed to have the 239 
scores below the 1.5. This score reflects the cutoff point with the best diagnostic accuracy of 240 
PTSD cases (Creamer et al., 2003). The Low scorers and Actors needed to have a PCL-5 241 
mean score under 1.5, while High Scorers should have not exceed 3 on this scale. Testing was 242 
performed in groups of up to 4-5 people. All participants were first given the CEQ. High and 243 
Low Scorers then received the MST and the SRSI. Actors, after filling out the CEQ, were 244 
asked to watch a video of people talking about the consequences of their traumatic experience 245 
( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFW4hYsYF). Then, they received a vignette, 246 
presenting a case of Alex, who went through a rough break-up with a threatening and abusive 247 
partner. Alex files an official complaint and wants the court to formulate a restraining order 248 
for the ex-partner. Still, Alex needs to convince th authorities that s/he is under a high 249 
psychological impact (i.e., traumatization) from the experiences with his/her ex-partner. 250 
Actors were asked to imagine that they were Alex and that the experiment was their official 251 
assessment. With this in mind, they performed the MST and filled out the SRSI. Finally, all 252 
participants received an exit questionnaire (e.g., “How convincing/educative/stressful was the 253 
vignette/video?” etc.) to which they could respond  a 5-point scale (1 = Not at all; 5 = 254 
Extremely). Actors were asked whether they used a particular strategy to feign high 255 
psychological impact and if so to describe it. At the end of the session, all participants 256 
received the debriefing form and were invited to ask questions. 257 
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 Our data were analysed using the two-way mixed model Analyses of Variance 259 
(ANOVA), Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), t-test and pair t-tests. Partial etta 260 
squared (ηp2) and Cohen’s ds were used for the effect size.  261 
Results 262 
Pre-screening Measures 263 
 The three groups did not differ in the frequency with which they selected certain 264 
events from the Aversive Events List (Fisher-Freeman Halton test = 27.4, p = .21; see 265 
Supplemental table 1). 266 
We ran a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with five pre-screening 267 
scores (IES-R total scale and subscales, and the PLC-5 scale) as dependent variables and 268 
groups (High scorers, Low scorers, and Actors) as independent variables (Table 1). 269 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated significant differences between High and Low scorers (all 270 
ps < .01), and between High scorers and Actors (all ps < .01). There were no significant 271 
differences between Low scorers and Actors (all ps > .05). 272 
Table 1.  
Pre-screening means across groups on IES-R total and subscales (0-4), and PCL-5 score (0-4). 
 Groups  
 
 High Scorers 
Low 
Scorers Actors F (2, 61) դ p
2 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)   
IES-R 2.05 (.30) .53 (.28) .75 (38) 143.40* .82 
• Intrusion 2.29 (.58) .60 (.36) .83 (.35) 81.30* .75 
• Avoidance 2.13 (.64) .58 (.38) .81 (.45) 62.22* .67 
• Hyperarousal 1.63 (.54) .35 (.34) .48 (.38) 61.00* .65 
PLC-5 1.61 (.69) .43 (.37) .65 (.43) 32.18* .51 
Note: * p < .01; Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated significant differences between High and Low 
scorers (ps < .01) and between High scorers and Actors (all ps < .01) on all types of measures. 
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 273 
Exit questions 274 
Actors rated the video as moderately educational (M = 3.84, SD = .71), highly helpful 275 
(M = 4.00, SD = .69), and as somewhat stressful (M = 2.22, SD = 1.35). The vignette was 276 
rated as highly understandable (M = 4.17, SD = .92), convincing (M = 4.22, SD = .87), and 277 
somewhat stressful (M = 2.50, SD = 1.04). Overall, Actors reported high motivation t  present 278 
themselves as Alex (M = 4.22, SD = 1.06). 61% of them reported having a strategy in order to 279 
perform better on the task, which was mainly evoking their own memories or memories of 280 
their close ones going through a similar experience to the one presented in the vignette. Also, 281 
they tried to visualize the situation and to analyze the emotional response that should follow. 282 
Fantasy proneness 283 
We ran a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to test differences between three 284 
groups in their fantasy proneness scores. High scorers (M = 11.63; SD= 4.58), Low scorers 285 
(M = 8.25, SD = 3.39), and Actors (M = 13.28, SD = 4.00) had significantly different scores 286 
on the CEQ (F(2, 61) = 8.80, p < .001; ηp2= .22). Bonferroni follow-up tests indicated 287 
significant differences between the High and Low scorers (p = .02), and between the Low 288 
scorers and Actors (p < .001). High scorers and Actors did not significantly differ (p = .60). 289 
Modified Stroop Task 290 
A two-way mixed ANOVA was calculated, with Groups as a between-subjects factor 291 
(High scorers vs. Low scorers vs. Actors), Word type as a within-subject factor (Neutral vs. 292 
Impact-related vs. Feigning-related), and reaction time as dependent variable. Our results 293 
showed a significant effect of Group, F(2, 61) = 13.58, p <.001, ηp2 = .30. However, there 294 
was no significant effect of Word type, F(2, 122) = 1.02, p = .316, ηp2 = .02, and no 295 
significant interaction between the Groups and Word type, F(4, 120) = 1.69, p = .157, ηp2 296 
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significantly differ from each other (ps > .05), whereas Actors scored significantly higher than 298 
both High (p < .001) and Low scorers (p < .001) on all three word types. Means and standard 299 
deviations are given in Table 22. 300 
We also ran a MANOVA with Impact-related and Feigning-related MST effect as 301 
dependent variables (Impact-related words RT – Neutral words RT and Feigning-related 302 
words RT – Neutral words RT) and group as an independent variable. Overall, groups did not 303 
significantly differ with respect to these interference scores (λ = .90, F(2, 61) = 1.69, p = .16, 304 
ηp2 = .05). Yet, Actors were the only group with a positive scores which indicated overall 305 
longer response latencies on Impact-related and Feigning-related words compared with the 306 
neutral words (see Table 2)3. 307 
Table 2.  
Groups’ means and standard deviations for reaction mes (RT in ms) of groups on the MST word 
types and the Interference scores. 
Word type 
Group 
High Scorers Low Scorers Actors 
n 22 24 18 
Neutral words 587.74 (101.30) 588.99 (97.84) 788.10 (222.83) 
Impact-related words 574.24 (93.97) 586.15 (78.11) 833.68 (307.93) 




Impact-related -13.50 (35.30) -2.85 (37.86) 45.58 (132.35) 
Feigning-related -17.12 (46.73) -3.83 (34.57) 15.61 (82.72) 
                                                          
2 The number of errors during the MST task ranged from 0 to 13 (M = 3.03, SD = 2.54) across participants. The 
errors in the Low scorers condition ranged from 0 to 13 (M = 3.38, SD = 2.96), and from 0 to 10 (M = 3.27, SD = 
2.59) in the High scorers condition. The errors in the Actors group ranged from 0 to 5 (M = 2.28, SD = 1.71). 
3 After close inspection of the data, we noticed that 4 participants (1 from High scorers, 1 from Low scorers, and 
2 from Actors group) had significantly higher scores than the rest of the group members. We performed all the 
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Furthermore, we investigated the differences between r action times to Impact-related, 308 
Feigning-related, and Neutral words within each group, and the differences in response 309 
latencies did not attain significance in any of the groups. Thus, we did not obtain a significant 310 
standard MST effect in the High scorers or a signifcant feigning MST effect in the Actors 311 
(see Table 3). 312 
Table 3.  
Paired t-test for differences in reaction times (RT) between word categories in groups. 
Word type pairs 
Group 
High scorers 
(df = 21) 
Low scorers 
(df = 23) 
Actors 
(df = 17) 
Impact-related words – Neutral words  -1.80  -.37  1.46  
Feigning-related words – Neutral 
words 
-1.72  -.54  .80  
Impact-related words – Feigning-
related words 
.44  .12  1.52  
Note: all ps>.05; The difference between Impact-related words and Neutral words refers to the so 
called standard MST effect; The difference between f igning-related words and Neutral words refers 
to the so called feigning MST effect. 
 To test the sensitivity of the MST in detecting over-reporting, we compared the High 313 
scorers, Low scorers, and the Actors group, and employed for the MST effect a liberal 314 
criterion of ≥ 0.10 ms (positive latency for Impact-related interference score (Impact-related 315 
RT - Neutral words RT)). Anyone above this cutoff was considered to manifest a standard 316 
MST effect. A score below ≤ - 0.10 ms was taken to be indicative of the absence of a standard 317 
MST effect, which would imply feigning according to Buckley et al. (2003). The correct 318 
classification for the High scorers and Actors was below the chance level (41% and 34%, 319 
respectively), and somewhat above it for the Low scorers group (58%; see Table 4). 320 
Table 4.  
Detection rates of MST and SRSI in High Impact, LowImpact and Actors group. 
Group 
MST Pass 
(≥ 0.10 ms) 
MST Fail 








High scorers 9 (41%) 13 (59%) 16 (73%) 6 (27%) 41% 73% 
Low scorers 10 (41%) 14 (58%) 21 (87.5%) 3 (12.5%) 58% 87.5% 
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Note: MST “pass” refers to a positive interference score indicating presence of high impact, “fail” is 
taken to be indicative of the absence of high psychological impact; SRSI “pass” indicates normal 
symptom endorsement tendencies, while “fail” is indicative of over-reporting. 
 321 
Self-Report Symptom Inventory 322 
Table 5 shows means and standard deviations of the thre groups on the main SRSI 323 
scales and relevant subscales. A MANOVA showed that overall, groups significantly differed 324 
on the two SRSI scales (λ = .66, F(2, 61) = 14.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .33). There was a significant 325 
difference between groups on both plausible and pseudo-symptom scales of the SRSI (F (2, 326 
61) = 45.62, p < .001, ηp2= .60; F (2, 61) = 46.09, p < .001, ηp2= .60, respectively). 327 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that Actors endorsed significantly more symptoms than 328 
High and Low scorers (ps < .01), which did not mutually differ in their endorsement of either 329 
plausible (p = .14) or pseudo-symptoms (p = .53).  330 
Similar was found when we looked into groups’ endorsement of plausible 331 
PTSD/Anxiety/Depression symptoms and pseudo-PTSD symptoms. Overall, there was a 332 
significant difference between groups (λ = .33, F(2, 61) = 21.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .42). Actors 333 
scored significantly higher on both subscales than e High and Low scorers, (ps < .001; ηp2’s 334 
> .59), which did not significantly differ from each other (ps = .50).  335 
Table 5.  
Means and standard deviations of all groups on the Self-Report Symptom Inventory’s plausible and 
pseudo-symptom scales. 
 Groups 
F test  
(2, 61) դ p
2 
SRSI High Impact Low Impact Actors 




21.00 (9.97) 16.08 (7.06) 39.84 (7.34) 45.62* .59 
Pseudo-
symptoms 
6.96 (6.45) 3.96 (3.11) 25.00 (11.54) 46.09* .60 

















1.86 (2.15) 1.04 (1.30) 7.00 (2.50) 51.57* .63 
Note: * p < .01; Bonferroni indicated significant differences between Actors and both High and Low 
scorers (p < .01), but no significant differences between the High and Low scorers (p > .05). 
We used the standard cutoff point of nine pseudosympto s (Merten at al., 2016). 336 
Table 4 shows the number and percentages of correct classifications and false positives (i.e., 337 
High scorers and Low scorers misclassified as feigners) and false negatives (i.e., Actors 338 
misclassified as High scorers). As can be seen, the SRSI was more effective than the absence 339 
of standard MST effect in detecting feigning in theActors group. Still, 6 participants (27%) in 340 
the High scorers group, and 3 (12.5%) from the Low scorers group were misclassified by the 341 
SRSI as feigners. 342 
Explorative analysis 343 
 To explore whether fantasy proneness was related to standard and feigning MST 344 
effects and the genuine and pseudosymptoms scales of the SRSI, we calculated Pearson 345 
product-moment correlations including only the High and Low scorers (honest par icipants, n 346 
= 46). The CEQ score did not significantly correlat with the standard MST effect (r = - 0.14; 347 
p = .35) or the feigning MST effect (r = .03; p = .84). On the other hand, the CEQ was 348 
correlated significantly and positively with the genuine and pseudosymptoms of the SRSI 349 
(Pearson r’s being .58 and .50, p’s < .001, respectively).  350 
 We performed a Welch’s t-test to investigate possible differences in fantasy proneness 351 
between participants from the High and Low scorers who were misclassified by SRSI as 352 
feigners (24% of the High scorers and 12.5% of the Low scorers, n = 9) and the rest of the 353 
participants in these groups (n = 37). Results indicated significant differences. Participants 354 
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13.78, SD = 2.82; Welch’s t-test(17.29) = 4.20, p < .001, r = .45), than participants who were 356 
correctly classified (M = 8.92, SD = 4.09)4.  357 
 358 
Discussion 359 
We compared the efficacy of the Modified Stroop Task nd a symptom over-report 360 
questionnaire (SRSI) in detecting feigned high impact experiences. Our results can be 361 
summarized as follows: First, in keeping with what others have noted about its fragile nature 362 
(e.g., Kimble, Frueh, & Marks, 2009), we did not observe the standard MST effect in our 363 
study. That is, the group with High (impact) scores did not manifest longer reaction times for 364 
impact-related words than for other categories of wrds.  365 
Second, in line with Constans et al. (2014) who found patients with over-reporting 366 
tendencies to exhibit longer response times than PTSD patients without over-reporting style, 367 
we observed that Actors exhibited “overall slowing down” on all types of words (impact-368 
related, feigning-related, and neutral). However, Actors did not show the significantly 369 
different interference score for Impact-related words (Impact-related words RT – Neutral 370 
words RT) compared with High and Low scorers. The lack of differences between groups 371 
with regard to the impact-related MST effect contradicts the assumption of its high sensitivity 372 
to real symptomatology and its utility in the detection of malingering (Buckley et al., 2003). 373 
Third, Actors failed to exhibit also a feigning MST effect. If we consider 374 
preoccupation with a certain topic (i.e., cognitive load, see Vrij et al., 2008), as a cause of the 375 
feigning MST effect (Cannon, 2003; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985), one could argue that the 376 
absence of this effect in our study has to do with our reliance on actors. Perhaps, then, Actors 377 
were not triggered by words such as “liar” or “fake”, precisely because they did not interpret 378 
their participation in our study as feigning but rather as role-playing. However, there is no 379 
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reason to assume that in real life, dedicated feigners do not understand their feigning as role-380 
playing that is justified by the circumstances.  381 
Fourth, we followed the suggestion of Buckley et al. (2003) and employed cutoff 382 
scores for differences in reaction times between word categories to identify feigners. After 383 
applying a liberal cutoff point to the MST data, the “hits” for both High scorers and Actor 384 
were below chance level, and slightly above for the Low scorers group. Overall, these 385 
findings provide no evidence to justify the use of the MST as a diagnostic tool to detect 386 
feigning.  387 
Fifth, Actors selected significantly more genuine and pseudosymptoms of the SRSI, 388 
compared with participants in the High and Low (impact) scorers, which did not differ from 389 
each other. These findings are well in line with previously established response patterns 390 
among over-reporters (Merten et al., 2016). Most importantly, the SRSI showed higher 391 
sensitivity to over-reporting than the MST. Scores on the SRSI detected 89% of Actors as 392 
over-reporters, which is even better detection rate than in our previous study (77%; Boskovic 393 
et al., 2018).  394 
Sixth, more than a quarter (27%) of the High scorers and 12.5% of the Low scorers 395 
were classified by the SRSI as over-reporters. These might be false positives (meaning that 396 
participants were wrongly categorized as over-report rs), but taking into account the 397 
vulnerability of the IES to exaggeration (McGuire, 2002), one could also argue that these 398 
participants actually over-reported their current impact. The latter might be more possible 399 
considering the similar scores of High and Low scorers on SRSI genuine symptom scale and 400 
PTSD/anxiety/depression subscales. To address this issue, we had a closer look at 401 
participants’ fantasy proneness (CEQ) scores, which are related to over-reporting 402 
(Merckelbach, 2004; Peace & Masliuk, 2011). CEQ scores did significantly correlated with 403 
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impact scores groups who were flagged by the SRSI as over-reporters did manifest 405 
significantly higher levels of fantasy proneness than correctly classified participants. Thus, it 406 
is likely that those participants in the impact scorers groups who exhibited elevated levels of 407 
fantasy proneness, engaged in over-reporting of their symptoms. 408 
A few limitations of the current study warrant comment. Some of the limitations were 409 
pre-set by the study design, whereas others reflect th  unresolved issues surrounding the 410 
MST. First, due to the external ethical restrictions, we used a subclinical student sample and 411 
our results may not be generalizable to people who present with full-blown PTSD symptoms, 412 
although studies have found that college sample might be adequate when investigating 413 
impacts of aversive life events (Smyth, Hockemeyer, H ron, Winderlich, & Pennebaker, 414 
2008). Second, participants were pre-screened based on their self-report without being asked 415 
to provide any collateral information, which could have led to inaccurate group assignment of 416 
participants to groups. Third, taking into consideration the variability of the events 417 
participants reported, we could not select words for the MST that were uniquely associated 418 
with every possible aversive event (e.g., fight with a friend or a family member dying). 419 
Therefore, it is possible that some of the words that we included (taken from Buckley et al., 420 
2003 and Moradi et al., 1999) did not trigger all prticipants’ current impact. Fourth, our pre-421 
screening results indicated that actors might present a specific population when it comes to 422 
aversive life experiences. While around 31% of participants reported either a traumatic 423 
experience and/or high-intensity PTSD symptoms, thi prevalence reached 45% among 424 
actors. Taking into consideration that actors show igher levels of engagement in fantasy than 425 
non-actors (Merckelbach et al., 2001), it is possible that they tend to distort their complaints 426 
by exaggerating the aversiveness of an event. Another possibility is that this population is 427 
especially vulnerable to high impact experiences and psychological distress (e.g., Elal & 428 
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In sum then, neither the absence of a standard MST effect, nor a general longer 430 
response latency during the MST reliably distinguished between people who had experienced 431 
a relatively high impact event from those who fabricated such impact. Despite the limitations 432 
of our study (e.g., sub-clinical sample, broad range of stimulus words), our results, along with 433 
those reported earlier (Boskovic et al., 2018), indicate that the MST does not allow accurate 434 
detection of feigned symptoms, making it unsuitable as a diagnostic tool. Arguably, this is 435 
related to the MST lacking a clear and articulated protocol for its design, use, and 436 
interpretation. On a positive note, although not perfect, the SRSI might be a promising 437 
alternative for differentiating between honest and feigned symptom presentation. 438 
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Detecting feigned high impact experiences: A symptom over-report questionnaire 
outperforms the emotional Stroop task 
 
Highlights: 
- The Modified Stroop Effect could not indicate feigned/genuine responses 
- Feigners endorse more symptoms on the SRSI than truth tellers 
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